Pascal's Wager: A Critique of Its Use
S uppose you are a Christian —in the absolute loosest sense of the word— and you come upon a man who professes that he does not believe in God. You may be dismayed and you may try and think of something clever to gently nudge him in the proper direction of being a theist. You quickly revert back to a simple wager in that if one dies believing in God, they will be saved; but if one dies not believing in God, they will be damned. You then make the case that it is better to risk dying and being wrong about God's existence, than it is to risk eternal damnation. You have used a simplified and convincing argument known as 'The Bet', or, Pascal's Wager. You, being clever, think that you have the atheist stuck in a simple dilemma where the only pragmatic and reasonable choice is to believe in God. For to believe in God, is to potentially gain the rewards of eternal happiness and life; whereas the risk in the alternative is damnation. However, you have made a mistake i